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Multinational Firms, Regional Integration and Globalising Markets: 







It is axiomatic that the potential of FDI to act as a catalyst for economic development varies by its 
motivation, and the competence level and scope of foreign-owned affiliates.  This chapter seeks to 
examine the effect of regional integration (RI) on MNE strategies while acknowledging other 
globalisation-related developments. 
  We examine MNE strategies in developing countries in four scenarios; (1) in a non-RI, pre-
liberalised environment; (2) with RI in a pre-liberalised environment (3) in a non-RI, post-liberalisation 
scenario, (4) RI in a post-liberalisation scenario. We also distinguish between least developed countries 
(LDCs), and intermediate developing countries, within North-South and South-South RI. 
  Liberalisation and a shift in policy orientation have had a greater affect on MNE strategies 
than integration. Globalisation of MNE activity and liberalisation has led to a downgrading of MNE 
activity in most LDCs. Much of the gains in FDI flows have been a result of redistribution, associated 
with privatisation. Countries with a threshold level of domestic capability and more efficient 
institutions have benefited from increases in the quality of FDI. RI schemes have reinforced these 
trends, benefiting those countries that have a viable domestic sector, and have created the appropriate 
multilateral institutions to exploit cross-border efficiencies. In general, South-South RI in a post-
liberalised world has had limited benefits for LDCs relative to intermediate developing countries. RI 
schemes need to be seen as an opportunity to respond gradually to globalisation in a controlled and 
stepwise- manner, and not as an alternative to multilateralism. 
 
 
Forthcoming in: (Robert Devlin and Antoni Estevadeordal, eds) Trade and Regional Integration in the 
Development Agenda, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2002 
 
 
Rajneesh Narula is Professor at the Copenhagen Business School, and the Centre for Technology, 
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1. Introduction 
Policy makers in the developing world are once again enthralled by the concept of regional 
integration (RI), and its potential benefits. This has led to a revival of previously unsuccessful 
or dormant schemes and the establishment of a clutch of new agreements. Part of this renewed 
enthusiasm has to do with the benefits that have accrued to members associated with various 
European RI schemes and NAFTA, and in particular, the experience of Mexico in NAFTA.  
  It is not a coincidence that this renewed interest in RI has occurred while the concept 
of globalisation pervades our understanding of the world economy. The two are not unrelated, 
and some have argued that RI projects appear to represent an opportunity to redress the 
inequities of multilateral agreements (Baldwin 1997), and to increase their autonomy from 
outside forces (Vernon 1996). In other words, RI schemes are seen as a response to 
globalisation. There are several similarities between globalisation and RI. Both are processes 
closely associated with cross-border economic activity, although globalisation is more a 
consequence of increased cross-border activity, while RI is intended to cause it. The 
proliferation of cross-border activity is regarded as a primary symptom of globalisation. Both 
globalisation and RI are believed to provide opportunities for more rapid economic growth, 
associated in large part with increased FDI and trade that are consequent from increased 
opportunities to exploit economies of scale. 
This chapter seeks to examine the effect of RI on MNE strategies. However, other 
developments have also significantly affected MNE strategies, and these need to be taken into 
account. Three powerful influences are highlighted. First, globalisation has changed the 
capacity and the means by MNEs to organise and coordinate their spatially distributed 
affiliates. Second, a broad policy shift has occurred in most developing countries from import-
substituting towards export- and FDI- driven outward orientation. Third, most countries are 
involved in multilateral liberalisation within the framework of multilateral institutions.  
  Therefore, MNE strategies in developing countries are examined in four separate 
situations; (1) in a non-RI, pre-liberalised environment; (2) with RI in a pre-liberalised 
environment; (3) in a non RI, post-liberalisation scenario, (4) with RI in a post-liberalisation 
scenario. Furthermore, it is a mistake to assume that all developing countries are homogenous. 
This chapter distinguishes between two groups of developing countries. Group I consist of 
least developed countries (LDCs) with little or no domestic industrial capacity. Group II 
countries possess an intermediate level of domestic capacity. These are contrasted here with 
industrialised countries, which are referred to as Group III.    2 
In this chapter, I will argue the following points. First, successful regional integration (a là 
EU, NAFTA) has been a consequence of globalisation, a reinforcement of de facto integration 
(by globalisation) with de jure integration (regional integration). Second, successful RI 
schemes and countries that have participated in globalisation share a number of similarities. 
Both RI and globalisation are ongoing processes rather than events. Successful RI projects 
have been marked by considerable efforts in development of institutions in the participating 
economies through structural adjustment, and the creation of appropriate cross-border 
institutions over a long period of time. Third, FDI does not drive economic growth, although 
it may help enhance it. FDI is not a sine qua non for development. Fourth, the response of 
MNEs to RI schemes is profit driven, and the net effect of RI schemes on the quality of their 
investments may well be negative, particularly for Group I countries. RI does not necessarily 
substitute or overcome the inequities of globalisation, at least as far as the activities of MNEs 
are concerned. However, the structural adjustment necessary for de facto RI helps to position 
countries to participate more effectively in globalisation.  
 
2. The Challenges of Globalisation and Regional Integration 
 
2.1 Globalisation as an institution building process. 
Although the term ‘globalisation’ is a much-abused one, it is generally accepted that it 
is an ongoing process, rather than an event.  Economic globalisation as used here implies the 
growing interdependence of locations and economic units across countries and regions. While 
a large literature has mushroomed describing the increasingly interwoven nature and cross-
border dependence of locations and firms, it is by no means so for all locations, firms or 
industrial sectors.  
Perspectives on globalisation vary quite considerably and depend on the unit of 
analysis. Nonetheless, it is manifest that cross-border interdependence between firms, 
institutions and locations has increased dramatically over the last 50 years and is likely to 
continue in this vein. It is not simply the presence of MNEs and their level of trade that 
defines a country’s involvement in globalisation, but the extent to which the economy at large 
is inextricably linked to the rest of the world. I want to emphasise that dependency on non-
national actors is not the same thing as interdependence. Through much of modern history, 
economies have been dependent on others as customers or suppliers. But this had largely been 
an arms-length relationship. Termination of a relationship might have had adverse effects, but 
not disastrous ones. In an interdependent relationship, important components of production   3 
are co-located, such that the failure of one prevents the other from functioning. 
Interdependence includes both firm and non-firm actors. By non-firm actors, I mean privately 
and publicly controlled organisations that determine the knowledge infrastructure that 
supplements and supports firm-specific economic activity. ‘Knowledge infrastructure’ is used 
in the sense proposed by Smith (1997) as being ‘generic, multi-user and indivisible’ and 
consisting of public research institutes, universities, organisations for standards, intellectual 
property protection, etc. that enables and promotes science and technology development. 
These non-firm actors are also increasingly interwoven across borders and rely on non-
domestic actors for crucial inputs, unlike in the past when every country’s non-firm sector 
was sovereign and independent.  
Globalisation cannot be credited as a primarily MNE- driven process. MNEs are 
simply the most visible of these processes. True, MNEs have sought to overcome cross-border 
market failures in their search for efficiencies, but there are numerous other concurrent and 
inter related events including technological developments (new technologies), political events 
(such as the Cold War), economic liberalisation, and the associated development of 
supranational institutions and regulations.  
  It is not my intention to delve into the complexities of cause and effect of 
globalisation. What I wish to highlight is that globalisation is very much associated (inter alia) 
with changes in the political economy and changes in their frame of reference. At the risk of 
oversimplification, the last half-century represents a volte face in terms of policy perspectives. 
Prior to WWII, nation states were de facto inviolable, individual and sovereign entities with 
clearly defined borders in both a political and economic sense. Well before import-
substituting arguments were formalised, the centrepiece of economic growth has been the 
concept of national self-sufficiency. Dating at least as far back as the first industrial 
revolution, every nation state has considered it essential to possess national capacity in so-
called ‘essential’ industries. Inward FDI was largely controlled and limited in its scope, unless 
it met stringent conditions that promoted the self-sufficiency view by enhancing the host 
country’s domestic sector.  
Today - whether voluntarily or through World Bank-sanctioned structural adjustment 
programs -the view is largely the opposite. Policies are oriented towards export-led growth 
and increased cross-border specialisation and competition, and most countries are now trying 
to promote economic growth through FDI and international trade – what has been referred to 
as the ‘New Economic Model’ (NEM) (Reinhardt and Peres 2000). This wave of 
liberalisation is part of the new, received wisdom that is focused on tackling the deep-rooted   4 
causes that underlie market distortions. Unfortunately, countries prefer to view their task as 
‘getting the prices right’ because this allows them to avoid root-and-branch restructuring.  
Liberalisation has happened gradually through the Triad countries over the post WWII 
era, but much more suddenly within the developing countries. Policies among European 
countries, for instance, have gradually evolved over 50 years, while almost all of the 
developing world have attempted to restructure since the late 1980s, and along with the 
formerly centrally planned economies, only seriously during the 1990s. 
  The point here is that developing countries find themselves in a new multilateral 
milieu, but one in which they have little experience. They have hitherto operated their 
economies on a national basis, and by looking inward they have been able to minimise 
exposure to external shocks. Institutions continue to remain largely independent and national. 
By institutions I mean the ‘sets of common habits, routines, established practises, rules, or 
laws that regulate the interaction between individuals and groups’ (Edquist and Johnson 
1997). Institutions create the milieu within which economic activity is undertaken and 
establish the ground rules for interaction between the various economic actors, and represent a 
sort of a ‘culture’. Institutions are both formal and informal, and will probably have taken 
years – if not decades – to create and sustain. To modify and develop institutions is a complex 
and slow process, particularly since they cannot be created simply by government fiat. Such 
change is even more complex where the new institutions require synchronisation between 
countries. The Triad countries have taken 50 years to adjust and reform institutions, but even 
here there is inertia. The EU, for instance, has failed to reform its agricultural sector. Norway 
remains largely mired in an import-substituting world, with a strong tendency towards central 
planning and state-owned economic actors (Narula 2002). 
  Liberalisation is an important force in economic globalisation since it requires a 
multilateral view on hitherto-domestic issues and promotes interdependence of economies. It 
is implicit within this view that FDI and MNE activity can be undertaken with much greater 
ease than previously. This view is enforced because countries have explicitly sought to 
encourage MNE activity as a source of much-needed capital and technology. In addition to 
financial crises, the general warming of the attitudes towards FDI emanate from an 
accelerating pace of technical change and the emergence of integrated production networks of 
MNEs (Lall 2000).  
 
2.2 Comparing globalisation and regional integration 
    5 
Despite being the object of numerous studies, there is no clear consensus on the universality 
of the welfare effects of regional integration (see e.g., Baldwin and Venables 1995). Much of 
the empirical work has been undertaken for various European integration schemes and 
NAFTA, which point to a positive impact for participants, but rather few studies have been 
undertaken on almost a 100 other ‘lesser’ integration schemes. The continued proliferation of 
south-south integration schemes is a matter of some consternation (see Baldwin 1997). 
Indeed, Venables (2000) argues that under certain situations, regionalism promotes 
divergence (see also Venables’ contribution to this Volume). It should be noted, however, that 
much of this (more economics-focused) work has concentrated on trade effects, with the 
effects on FDI being rather neglected, despite the anticipated benefits from RI being 
associated with trade and investment. 
From an economics perspective, the static and dynamic gains from regional 
integration schemes result in both long and short run economic gains. This is due, inter alia, to 
improved economies of scale and scope, increased efficiency through the rationalization and 
reallocation of activities of firms, and improved inter-regional linkages (Eden 2001). The 
improved economic conditions are also expected to positively influence inflows of FDI.   
These positive externalities will, of course, vary by types of RI. At one extreme, there are 
shallow integration schemes, which essentially involve the reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers between member countries. A vast majority of regional integration schemes in 
developing countries fall into this category. Other agreements relax restrictions on 
government procurement and cross-border FDI, as is the case with NAFTA.  
At the other extreme, deep integration schemes may include common industrial policies, 
elimination of all intra-regional tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the adoption of common 
external barriers, and may progress as far as monetary and political union. Most prominent of 
these is the European Union initiative, which has itself evolved over time from a rather 
limited free trade agreement to a political and economic union. The net benefits of accession 
to regional integration schemes vary by the depth of integration. It is axiomatic that the 
benefits from membership in shallow agreements that have been in place for a short period are 
unlikely to prove as beneficial as deep integration agreements that have been implemented for 
a long period. 
There are a number of inescapable parallels and similarities between regional 
integration and globalisation, which deserve attention, especially since the current RI schemes 
are being undertaken with globalisation as a backdrop. The big difference is this: RI schemes 
are attempts at social and economic engineering, while globalisation has been almost a   6 
virtuous intertwining of a variety of social, political and technological developments and 
events. However, the most significant similarity is that both create larger de facto markets 
from several de jure smaller ones (Narula 1999). In addition to creating larger markets, RI, 
like liberalisation, is expected to generate benefits from rationalisation of economic activity 
across borders by exploiting differences in comparative advantage.  
Regional integration, like globalisation, is an ongoing process. Countries cannot 
simply ‘jump’ from non-integration to deep integration. RI also requires the modification of 
existing institutions and the establishment of new ones. Despite it being primarily a north-
north scheme, the experience of European integration is instructive for several reasons. First, 
European political economy mirrors the policy shift typical of developing countries today, 
except that it has occurred gradually rather than suddenly. Second, it illustrates the effects of 
moving from a shallow agreement to an increasing level of intensity of integration, a 
professed aim of several developing country RI schemes. In addition, there exists a series of 
concentric agreements within European regional integration. Apart from the EU, there are 
associated agreements within the framework of the European Economic Area linking the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) with the EU, as well as numerous associate members 
amongst the Central and Eastern European countries. That is, there are (or have been) 
considerable differences in development levels between participants. Third, it allows us to 
observe developments over a longer-term perspective, unlike NAFTA (arguably the only 
other RI scheme that has experienced some level of success) which has a much shorter 
history. Nonetheless, we should note two important distinctions. First, these schemes have 
been primarily North-North or North-South, and second, much of RI was initiated prior to the 
advent of global liberalised markets. Regional integration in the case of the EU can be 
regarded as a preliminary experiment in multilateralism, a kind of mini-globalisation.  
  Particular emphasis needs to be drawn to the European experience on building 
institutions. Even the most shallow RI scheme requires a considerable transition period. 
Institutions need to adjust, if they are not to experience adverse shock. There needs to be an 
alignment of institutions and economic structures amongst members, and this is primarily the 
reason there have been multi-track membership trajectories for various applicant countries to 
join the EU. Countries such as Sweden and Finland did not require a long transition period for 
full membership, while Poland and the Czech Republic seem to need considerably longer, and 
Bulgaria longer still.  Not all sectors can evolve towards the common standard at the same 
rate, and various transition periods and exceptions are marked out for particular sectors.     7 
  In other words, it seems that a certain congruence of economic systems and relevant 
institutions must exist as a pre-condition for successful RI. It is for this reason that 
considerable investment has been made (through the structural and framework programmes) 
to achieve such a convergence between member countries of the EU. The level of 
convergence required for shallow agreements may be much less, but the point is very much 
the same. 
In a sense, RI acts as a catalyst for convergence, and hence globalisation. Certainly, in 
the case of EU integration this has been an explicit objective. At its heart there has been a 
belief that cooperation by (both firm and non-firm) economic actors across the various 
European countries represents a means by which the technological and economic gap between 
the various participants (as well as relative to the US) might be narrowed.  
 
3. Multinationals and economic development 
  FDI is regarded as a primary – and explicit - means by which growth can be promoted. 
Further it is axiomatic  that the availability of foreign capital and technology is an important 
means for economic catch-up. However, although inward FDI does not represent the only 
option available to developing countries, given their urgency and limited resources it may 
represent the most efficient option (Narula and Dunning 2000). This is for at least four 
reasons. First, the costs of acquiring technological and organisational know-how through 
arms-length means is an expensive undertaking, and given the shortage of capital this option 
is not open to many developing country governments with limited resources. Second, 
liberalised markets mean that firms, ceteris paribus, are likely to be more eager to maintain 
control of their assets and internalise the market for themselves, either through wholly owned 
subsidiaries or in joint ventures. Third, infant industry protection is de rigeur in creating a 
domestic sector from scratch, and protected markets are a limited option within the 
framework of WTO. Fourth, the resources, complementary clusters and assets necessary to 
support a viable and strong domestic sector are also capital and knowledge intensive. The role 
of competition in fostering viable domestic industry is an especially important point. This is 
best illustrated by the failure of the import-substituting programme in a large number of 
countries to achieve just this objective.  
FDI, however, is not a sine qua non for economic development. There are three other 
conditions that need to be satisfied: 
1.  Does the kind of FDI being attracted generate significant spillovers?    8 
2.  Does the domestic sector have the capacity to absorb these spillovers? It is perhaps 
worth adding (in the case of LDCs particularly) that there needs to be a domestic 
sector.   
3.  Is the FDI that is being attracted, a substitute or complementary to domestic industry? 
 
It is true that the determinants of economic development are similar to the determinants of 
FDI, but this does not mean that there is a simple cause and effect between them. Particular 
types of FDI tend to be attracted to countries with certain levels of economic development and 
appropriate economic structures (see Narula and Dunning 2000 for a review). But simply to 
‘pump’ a country full of FDI will not lead to its catapulting to a higher stage of development.   
  Indeed, the presence and condition of the domestic sector is crucial. If no domestic 
sector were to exist (say, in a LDC) there can no opportunity to absorb spillovers from FDI: In 
a perfectly liberalised world, MNEs have no incentive to encourage the development of 
domestic firms to meet their needs because other MNEs would be able to do so, either through 
imports or FDI. In an extreme case, there may actually be no FDI inflow, because MNEs will 
prefer to locate production in a regionally optimal location and simply import. Thus, FDI in a 
completely liberalised milieu does not necessarily lead to growth in the domestic sector.  The 
benefits of FDI only occur when there is domestic investment, and where the domestic 
investment has the ability to internalise the externalities from FDI.  
  Nonetheless, such an idealised world does not exist, but the point is that FDI is not a 
guarantee of growth. FDI and economic development are highly correlated phenomena, both 
being strongly dependent on the specific resources, institutions, economic structure, political 
ideologies and social and cultural fabric of countries. The kind of FDI activity a country 
might attract (or wish to attract) at different stages of development, are different (Dunning and 
Narula 1996, Narula 1996). Indeed, these two issues are closely related. Although every 
individual investment is a unique event, both the type of investment and the stage of 
economic development of the host country allow us to generalise that the situation currently 
faced by the least developed countries is fundamentally different from the catching-up and 
converging countries (Narula and Dunning 2000).  
I wish to emphasise that the availability of foreign-owned capital (either portfolio or 
direct) for developing countries is not at issue here. There have been capital flows of both 
kinds to viable projects in the LDCs, particularly in extractive industries, and through 
privatisation programmes. Nonetheless, in general, these activities do not provide much 
opportunity for technological spillovers and beneficial externalities. In other words, it is not   9 
FDI activities that are hard to attract, but certain kinds of FDI. There are two (interrelated) 
perspectives from a micro-level that need to be considered. First, there is considerable 
variation in the motivation for the investment. Second, from a MNE perspective, there is 
considerable variation in the types of subsidiaries. The following sub-sections discuss this 
assertion in some detail. 
 
3.1 Motives for multinational investment and developing countries 
It is generally acknowledged that there are four main motives for investment: to seek 
natural resources; to seek new markets; to restructure existing foreign production through 
rationalisation, and to seek strategically related created assets. These in turn can be broadly 
divided into two types. The first three represent motives which are primarily asset-exploiting 
in nature: that is, the investing company's primary purpose is to generate economic rent 
through the use of its existing firm-specific assets. The last is a case of asset-augmenting 
activity, whereby the firm wishes to acquire additional assets which protect or augment their 
existing created assets in some way.  
In general, LDCs are unlikely to attract much asset-augmenting FDI. Such investment 
is primarily an activity undertaken in intermediate industrialising economies and 
industrialised economies. While there has been an increase in the location of asset-
augmentation activity in some developing countries during the last decade, this continues to 
be the exception rather than the rule. This is simply because the human resources, 
technological capabilities and organisational skills that these countries (or their firms) possess 
tend to be in relatively low-technology and natural resource intensive sectors which have 
become 'generic' over time (Dunning et al 1998).  
 
Resource seeking FDI 
Resource seeking FDI is a case where existing national technological assets and 
knowledge infrastructure do not play a significant role in determining FDI inflows. Where a 
region or country possesses an absolute advantage in a given scarce resource, it is in a strong 
position to extract rent from the MNE, despite the absence of infrastructure or a domestic 
sector. Where the resource sought is a natural one, the marginal cost of its extraction to both 
parties is close to zero. As such, the location is able to generate economic rent depending on 
the resource's rarity and accessibility in other locations.  
Resource-seeking investment generally (but not always) implies low-value adding 
activity and low capital expenditure on plant and equipment (extractive industries being the   10 
exception). Such FDI is more footloose. A purely resource-seeking investment is not normally 
tightly integrated into the investing firm’s organisational structure: indeed MNEs rarely 
engage in complete internalisation of raw material markets, preferring instead to conclude 
non-equity agreements with foreign firms or to purchase their inputs at arms-length prices.  
In general, FDI in LDCs is often almost entirely resource seeking. Since there are few 
other L advantages to offer MNEs, this is often the only kind of FDI present. Where vertical 
forward integration and further value adding does occur, either to exploit markets or to access 
other L-advantages, the ‘stickiness’ of the investment increases.  
 
Market-seeking FDI 
Market seeking FDI only gains prominence in situations where the local or adjacent 
markets provide access to significant opportunities to achieve production economies of scale. 
This requires not only a sizeable population, but also the ability of the market to support 
(within a reasonable time frame) the expected demand on which the investment is based. In 
addition though, there is often a ‘follow-the-leader’ strategic response by other firms, 
whereby a market that might have supported two or three competitors is inundated with a 
larger number of new entrants than the market can efficiently support. The case of both the 
Chinese and the Indian automobile market represent examples of such a scenario, where 
despite the potential for high demand levels, few participants are actually able to make a 
profit. This is not the case with all sectors – investments in food and personal products for 
instance are much more likely to achieve economies of scale, since these products have a 
relatively low-income elasticity of demand. Indeed, the automobile industry may represent a 
special case in these countries, for what is now described as aggressive market-seeking 
investments in developing countries, in many cases, began life as defensive import-
substituting investments. These were only permitted under certain stringent conditions, but the 
MNE normally expected to have access to a captive protected market in return.  
Market seeking FDI is largely based on a single central locational advantage. Its 
presence or absence is stage-dependent, but is essentially an exogenous event, with one 
exception. Membership of a free trade area allows countries that have small domestic markets 
to expand their de facto market size.  In such situations, however, several formerly sovereign 
markets become integrated, and the choice of location then rests on other L-advantages.  This 
may have detrimental effects too: once sanctions against South Africa were lifted, a certain 
hollowing out of market seeking FDI in neighbouring countries was observed as a result of 
their free trade agreements with South Africa.    11 
 
Efficiency seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI 
These two types of investment are similar in that they both normally require a certain 
threshold level of created assets and are generally regarded as being associated with the 
process of globalisation. It is no surprise that they are generally associated with middle-
income and industrialising countries, but especially in the case of asset-seeking FDI, with the 
industrialised countries.  
As such, efficiency seeking investment in the least developed countries is an 
ambiguous concept, although, for many years, MNEs have engaged in export-oriented 
resource-seeking investment, which is de facto efficiency-seeking FDI. Moreover, efficiency 
investment - in the sense that different aspects of manufacturing activity are located in 
particular locations to exploit the economies of cross-border specialisation and the uneven 
distribution of immobile created assets- is a relatively new phenomenon  
In both of these types of investments, the role of sub-national clusters and the 
agglomeration of related activities is significant. The externalities available to countries that 
are home to centres of agglomeration, or possess the necessary science and technology 
infrastructure necessary to attract asset-augmenting FDI, are considerably different from 
countries which primarily attract asset-exploiting FDI. It should be noted that even where 
centres of excellence or agglomeration exist in a given industry, this does not imply that 
further knowledge intensive investments will be attracted to the same location by virtue of a 
single cluster existing, unless clear spillovers or externalities exist. Nonetheless, countries that 
have (the basis for) agglomerative economies are the ones likely to receive such FDI.  
 
3.2 Typology of MNE Subsidiaries 
Although there are several typologies of affiliates, they serve different purposes. In particular, 
attention has primarily been focused on first-world MNEs located in first world locations. 
Some of these typologies have tended to examine particular aspects of value adding activity, 
or particular industries. We will utilise a typology based on previous work by Pearce (1989, 
1999) and Doz (1986), but modified for our purposes.  
The nature of the activities undertaken by a subsidiary and its potential level of 
embeddedness in the host economy vary according to 1) the level of competence of the 
subsidiary; and 2) the scope of its activities (Benito et al 2001).  
 
***Figure 1 about here***   12 
 
Figure 1 illustrates our typology of subsidiaries according to these two scales. A 
typical value added chain can be viewed from a ‘level of competence’ perspective consisting 
of ‘strategic’ and ‘operational’ elements. Activities such as sales and manufacturing are 
operational in nature, while R&D centres and headquarters functions are strategic in nature. In 
general, strategic elements tend to be located close to locations which are regarded as 
important to the MNE. Following Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), there is a close link between 
the influence of the subsidiary and the strategic importance of its local environment. Strategic 
elements perform a critical role in a network of units, adding value through contributing their 
own expertise as well as by coordinating the flow of knowledge within the network.  Second, 
there is considerable variation between subsidiaries in the scope of their activities, with 
certain subsidiaries performing single and specialized activities, and others performing a 
larger variety and of greater value (Figure 1).  
 
Truncated miniature replicas (TMR) 
As their name implies, truncated miniature replicas are essentially a duplication of the parent 
firm, although perhaps not with the same scale of production and not all of the various 
components of value adding activity. Typically, they do not undertake basic research but may 
modify and adapt products originally developed by the parent. Although TMRs vary in the 
extent to which they are truncated, generally speaking, they tend to have a low or medium 
level of competence (Figure 1). TMRs tend to have an extensive market scope, in the sense 
that they have a large product range, but supply a limited and isolated market (Pearce 1999). 
TMRs tend to have a considerable degree of autonomy in their activities, although the parent 
company exerts overall strategic control. This means, for instance, that the parent decides new 
additions to the product range. They are nationally responsive  and apart from a few 
advantages derived from being part of a MNE network, such as lower cost of capital and 
technology, they are similar to other indigenous firms. Their primary motive is market-
seeking and most often associated with import-substituting programs. The parent-affiliate 
relationship is weakly developed and the two are essentially independent of each other.  
 
Rationalised affiliates 
Rationalised affiliates are much more closely integrated into the MNE network. Their 
operations are based on an efficiency seeking motivation, aimed at optimising costs over 
multiple locations and often produce a small range of products. There is a strategic   13 
interdependence between the MNE network and the affiliate. Pearce (1989, 1999) 
distinguishes between two types of rationalised affiliates: the Rationalised Production 
Subsidiary (RPS) and the World Product Mandate subsidiary (WPM). Pearce and Tavares 
(1998) propose a further sub-classification of WPMs in Regional Product Mandate (RPM) 
subsidiaries and Sub-Regional Product Mandate (SRPM) subsidiaries. Fundamentally, an 
RPS is part of the MNEs global strategy and is engaged in the production of a particular 
value-adding aspect based on specific competitive advantages of the RPS relative to other 
subsidiaries. Its products are often intermediate goods, or products or services complementary 
to other RPS. R&D is typically not associated with an RPS and control over its operations is 
exerted from headquarters. Its activities are confined to operating activities, but not strategic 
ones. 
WPM subsidiaries, on the other hand, have a greater strategic role, more decision-
making power, and are often engaged in higher value-adding activity. They are based on a 
strategic asset-seeking motivation, as well as an efficiency-seeking one. WPMs maintain 
global or regional control over a particular product line or functional area, and are designated 
‘centres of excellence’. That is, ‘strategic’ activities such as R&D and headquarters functions 
are included in the affiliate’s responsibilities and it exerts control over other affiliates in the 
same region or worldwide.   
  RPMs and SRPMs are truncated versions of WPMs, in that they have a broader 
mandate towards a region (such as participants of a RI scheme) or a sub-region (say, the 
Nordic countries, South Asia). They are designed to be responsive in particular to a smaller 
catchment area. RPMs and SRPMs aim to meet particular market needs that may be unique to 
a given group of countries, because the region or sub-region requires services and products 
that need to be differentiated from other RPMs and SRPMs, or because local conditions 
require a greater responsiveness (Pearce and Tavares 1998).  
 
Single-activity affiliates 
  Single activity affiliates are a cross between TMRs and RPSs. On the one hand, they 
represent an extreme version of a TMR, in that they undertake a single aspect of value adding 
activity.  In other words, they are severely truncated. On the other hand, such affiliates may in 
fact be part of a company’s rationalised strategy: the comparative advantage of the location is 
best suited for such activities. Nonetheless, a differentiation needs to be made particularly in 
the developing country scenario, as such affiliates are often marginal to the firm, in terms of 
strategic importance, unlike RPS subsidiaries which may also be specialised in one form of   14 
activity. They are ‘generic’ in the sense that there are often numerous such affiliates in 
various developing country locations, and while there may be a dependence, they contribute 
nothing unique to the assets of the firm and are easily substituted. These affiliates are not 
involved in decision-making or strategic planning, and are virtually at arms-length to the 
MNE. 
  Such affiliates typically tend to be engaged at the extremes of the value-adding chain. 
The first type are trading affiliates, engaged in trading activities, and, in the limit, in 
marketing and after-sales service. The second sub-category is resource-extractive affiliates. 
Resource-extractive affiliates are at the other end of the value chain, engaged solely in 
acquiring (primarily through extractive activity) scarce or otherwise valuable crude resources, 
for the express purposes of exporting these raw materials for use in other locations, whether 
by another affiliate, or by an unrelated firm.  
  It bears repeating that there is considerable variation between industrial sectors, 
individual MNEs as well as host and home country factors. For instance, in the food and 
beverages sectors, subsidiaries are organised primarily as TMRs. MNEs with greater 
international exposure and dependence on foreign markets are more inclined towards RPS or 
WPMs.   
It is axiomatic that subsidiary roles evolve over time, due both to internal, MNE-
specific factors and to changing non-firm exogenous developments, including liberalisation of 
markets and regional integration (Mariotti and Piscitello, 2001; Birkinshaw and Hood, 2000).  
The changing external environment will inevitably induce some changes in subsidiary 
roles. Once an MNE rationalizes the number of subsidiaries or reorganizes the activities 
across borders, the remaining and/or new units will likely experience changes in scope and 
areas of responsibility.  Increases in scope can typically be found when the number of 
subsidiaries are rationalized or local conditions encourage localization of activities 
(Birkinshaw, 1996). Similarly, the scope may be narrowed to focus on specific activities and 
build expertise within the selected area (Surlemont, 1998;). Hence, changes in scope are often 
related to both organizational and spatial considerations.   
 
4. MNE strategies, Liberalisation and regional integration 
In this section we will examine MNE strategies in response to liberalisation and regional 
integration in four scenarios: (1) in a pre-liberalised environment; (2) participation in a RI 
scheme in a pre-liberalised environment (3) in a post-liberalisation scenario (4) participation 
in a RI scheme in a post-liberalisation scenario. We consider three groups of countries. Group   15 
I countries are least developed with little or no domestic capability. Group II are developing 
countries which possess an intermediate domestic capability, while Group III are 
industrialised countries which have a high domestic capability and are home countries of 
MNEs. There are a finite number of RI schemes possible between these three groups, as 
illustrated by Figure 2. We will examine each of our scenarios from every practical option for 
developing countries. 
 
****FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
4.1 MNE strategies in a non-RI, non-liberalised world 
Let us take the situation of countries prior to liberalisation, i.e., where import-substituting 
policies are in force. Group I countries tend to be host to single-activity subsidiaries. In Group 
II and III, MNEs respond to investment opportunities primarily by establishing miniature 
replicas, although the extent to which they are truncated varies considerably between 
countries. The extent of truncation is determined by:  
1.  The size of the local market in terms of potential and actual demand;  
2.  The extent to which the MNE is afforded a monopoly; 
3.  The stringency of the import-substituting regime. Different countries applied different 
local content requirements, and barriers on the imports of intermediate goods; 
4.  The capacity of domestic industry to supply local content; 
5. The stringency of foreign ownership restrictions and the risk of expropriation. 
Ownership is significant to the MNE because it determines its ability to control the 
activities of the subsidiary, and the use of its technological assets. Where domestic 
industry is weak or non-existent, ownership restrictions also influence whether 
foreign-based suppliers might also be able to engage in FDI to manufacture local 
content;  
6.  The cost of capital relative to that available on international markets (or at home), and 
restrictions on where capital must be borrowed; 
7.  The potential to generate rent; and restrictions on repatriation of dividends and interest 
payments to the rest of the MNE in hard currency. 
 
This list is partial, and these factors interrelated. Numerous trade-offs exist between these 
factors. For instance, where local demand is large and rent-generation opportunities high 
(such as in China), MNEs are willing to accept greater restrictions on ownership (than say   16 
Peru). IBM’s decision to divest from India in the mid-1970s was triggered by increased local 
content requirements, and a potential loss of majority ownership. The issue in this case was 
control, rather than ownership: during the same period, IBM’s Indonesia subsidiary was a 
shell company, while its operations locally were undertaken by a domestically-owned 
company. However, IBM had full operational and strategic control of the Indonesian firm.  
  But by far the most important determinant on truncation, and thereby the scope of 
activities and competence level of the subsidiary (since broadly speaking most countries 
maintained similar import-substituting regulations prior to the mid-1980s) are associated with 
market size, and capacity and capability of domestic industry. Group I countries without a 
domestic sector and with low demand were host to the most truncated subsidiaries, often to 
the point of being single-activity subsidiaries. Activities were primarily in sales and 
marketing, and natural resource extraction. Larger Group II and Group III countries (for much 
of Europe still maintained some form of import-substitution into the 1970s, and non-EU 
countries such as Norway, well into the 1980s) with domestic technological capacity (such as 
Brazil and India) were host to the least truncated subsidiaries, often with R&D departments.  
Nonetheless, products manufactured by these TMRs were either obsolete in the home country 
or designed domestically strictly for local competition, or for a limited export market 
(Mortimore 1998). In Group II, competition was considerably limited, domestic productivity 
low, and in many cases, economies of scale were not reached. Production costs are therefore 
higher than equivalent imports, tariff and non-tariff barriers induced market imperfections, 
allowing for rent-generation. 
 
4.2 Shallow regional integration with non-liberalisation  
Assume an RI scheme that proposes a common internal tariff and a (higher) common external 
tariff, such that this de facto enlarges the market, while maintaining an import-substituting 
(pre-liberalisation) stance. 
Group I-Group II and Group II-Group III RI schemes. 
First, take the case of RI between countries A and B at different levels of domestic capability. 
Assume that Country B is at a lower level (whether Group I or II) than Country A (Group II 
or III). Country A’s existing TMRs might see an increase in the scope of their activities. 
Country B might see an upgrading of its single-activity subsidiaries to TMRs, as market size 
increases. In addition, there may be a redistribution effect to take advantage of differences in 
comparative advantage. Broadly speaking, however, this will be relatively small with shallow 
integration, depending upon the extent and sectors for which intra-regional barriers decline. It   17 
will also be lower with a Group I – Group II RI scheme, than with a Group II-III RI scheme. 
In either case there will be a net increase in FDI to both countries, and an increase in 
competence and scope of subsidiary activity. There will be no crowding-out of domestic 
investment, and possibly a crowding-in in the case of country A that has the technological 
capability to nurture domestic sector. Intra-regional FDI will occur, primarily from A to B, 
depending on the industry, but this is relatively minor, particularly where Country A is a 
Group II country, in the form of single-activity subsidiaries to exploit resources in Country A, 
or as sales affiliates.  With a Group II-III RI scheme, intra-regional FDI will be greater, but 
primarily downwards, and to exploit differences in comparative advantage (such as the 
maquiladoras in Mexico).  
  Broadly speaking, however, investments in shallow agreements will tend to be ‘local’ 
with the objective of accessing individual local markets separately, rather than combined 
markets. This is borne out by investments in the earlier stages of NAFTA and the EU. Much 
of the earlier FDI in European RI in the 1970s was of a defensive local market-exploiting 
nature (Dunning 1997). Investments in each country were primarily associated with its 
domestic market, and with overcoming barriers to imports. 
  The evidence points to a potential for a greater scope of MNE activities in a non-
liberalisation RI scenario for Group I and Group II countries, regardless of whether the RI 
was South-South or North-South. In the case of Group I countries, certainly, MNEs invested 
in response to RI where otherwise little or no FDI might be attracted. However, opportunities 
– due to import substitution and alternative possibilities in Country A – are limited for 
sequential FDI and upgrading. Potential for a higher quality and quantity of FDI does not 
however mean that spillovers and externalities are internalised. Where domestic firms are able 
to internalise spillovers and improve their capabilities, for instance, by becoming efficient 
suppliers to MNEs, this acts as a reinforcing mechanism for the upgrading of the MNEs' 
competence levels. If the efficiency of the TMR approaches international levels, it is possible 
that the subsidiary in Country A is upgraded to a SRPM or RPM. 
Intra-Group I RI schemes 
  Second, take the case of a regional integration between group I countries with similar 
comparative advantages. Neither A nor B, on its own possesses sufficient location advantages 
to attract TMRs, but together their combined market size may justify TMRs in some sectors. 
This will be in either basic sectors such as resource processing and food sectors, in other 
words, Hecksher-Ohlin industries. There is little likelihood, however, that affiliates will 
improve domestic capacity, mainly because the domestic sector is non-existent.   18 
 
4.3 MNE strategies after liberalisation  
Most South-South agreements established prior to the liberalisation of the 1990s were de facto 
inoperational, as were most North-South agreements, with the exception of Mexico-US FTA. 
Therefore, in a sense, liberalisation was undertaken in a de facto un-integrated environment.  
Liberalisation as undertaken by most developing countries has had the following 
consequences for MNE activity: 
1.  Floating currencies, removal of exchange restrictions and subsequent devaluation;  
2.  Reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to manufactured imports; 
3.  Reduction of local content requirements for incumbent MNEs; 
4.  Removal of export requirements from MNEs; 
5.  Reduction of direct and indirect subsidies to domestic industry; 
6.  Privatisation of some state-owned assets. 
 
However, as discussed earlier, liberalisation is one facet of globalisation. Globalisation has 
affected the ownership assets of MNEs in that it has changed the way in which they organise 
and undertake cross-border activities. This is not just a result of the global wave of economic 
liberalisation and regional integration (particularly NAFTA and EU) but also a result of inter 
alia, the increasing enforceability of transactions across borders, increased competition, the 
growing need for competences in multiple technologies and improved information and 
communications technologies.   
Although the amount of total FDI stock directed towards developing countries may 
have increased, an increasing proportion of new investment is of a kind that requires the use 
of specialised created assets, and therefore tends to be directed to the developed and wealthier 
developing countries with the necessary level of technological assets. On the one hand, MNEs 
seek more specialised inputs, and on the other, more countries offer generic inputs. 
Liberalisation has meant that a much larger (possibly twice as much as two decades 
previously) pool of countries offer ‘generic’ location advantages such as access to natural 
assets and basic infrastructure. The problem of too many countries chasing a limited amount 
of FDI is exacerbated by the competition between provinces and regions within countries, 
which offer their own set of incentive schemes to funnel scarce investments to their locations 
(Mytelka 1996). Countries and provinces are therefore under pressure to ‘give away’ bigger 
investment incentives in order to attract the FDI that is often central to their development 
strategies. There is a danger that due to the increased competition, countries may give away   19 
more than the potential benefits that accrue from the MNE activity (Mytelka 1996, McIntyre 
et al 1996).  
It is important to realise that the process of liberalisation has increasingly become an 
exogenous event with a pervasive influence beyond any single country’s control (Narula and 
Dunning 2000). Although the opening up or liberalisation of any particular country is a 
country-specific (and therefore endogenous) event, the benefit that accrues to the country 
from this event is a function of how many other countries have also liberalised. Furthermore, 
membership of multilateral institutions such as the WTO (as well as free trade areas and other 
forms of economic integration) obliges the participating countries to conform their 
liberalisation policies to a common standard. Membership of multilateral blocs can affect an 
involuntary change in policy, since, with increasingly few countries still operating within a 
command economy or a import-substituting regime, there are few opportunities for such 
countries to engage in economically sound non-market arrangements. 
To sum up, globalisation has affected the spatial distribution of MNE activity on a 
multi-country, international level as well as on an individual country basis. This is due not just 
to liberalisation in an individual country, but also due to liberalisation as a multi-country 
phenomenon. Combined with the changing nature of MNEs' ownership-specific assets, this 
has led to a reorganisation of MNE activities within countries and across countries.  
The strategies of MNEs in any given developing country can be affected vis-à-vis their 
operations in three possible ways:  
1.   New and/or upgraded affiliates: There are opportunities for new FDI inflows, 
firstly through new initial investment, resulting in new subsidiaries that did not 
exist previously, and secondly through sequential investment as firms upgrade 
the scope and competence of existing subsidiaries. In a static and simplistic 
view, this leads to an increase in total capital (i.e., domestic investment plus 
foreign investment). 
2.  Downgrading of subsidiaries: MNEs may divest their operations in response to 
better location advantages elsewhere, or reduce the intensity of operations by 
lowering the level of competence and/or scope of their subsidiary. Total capital 
in this scenario may decrease. 
3. Redistribution  effect: There is the possibility for a redistribution effect, with 
total capital staying constant. That is, sectors that were dominated by domestic 
capital may be transferred to foreign ownership. 
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Of course, in reality it is hard to separate these three effects, since these developments 
are hard to measure, not least because individual countries and MNEs are idiosyncratic and 
path dependent. Firms may take particular strategic decisions because of long-term and non-
economic considerations, and policies of countries may vary between sectors and sub-sectors.  
Nonetheless, there are certain broad trends which can be observed. It is clear, for 
instance, that the erosion of the kind of location advantages associated with protected trade 
and investment regimes has had far reaching consequences. Although the benefits of 
liberalisation in terms of encouraging inward FDI are notable, some MNEs have divested in 
response to liberalisation where the initial MNE activity was to overcome tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Since the conclusion of NAFTA, for example, defensive import substitution FDI in 
Canada has fallen sharply. Although information on divestment in developing countries has 
not been systematically collected, it is likely that, since proportionally more FDI prior to 
liberalisation was defensive market seeking, this phenomenon might be a significant one. It is 
important to note that although data suggests that there was a drastic decline in FDI stocks in 
Group I countries in the late 1980s, this reflects in part the devaluation of domestic currencies 
relative to the dollar. Thus, while the property, plant and equipment, and the scope and 
competence of an affiliate in, say, Argentina or Chile may have remained identical pre- and 
post-liberalisation, its value on the books of the MNE may have declined in hard currency 
terms. Nonetheless, a wide variety of Group I countries have seen a decline in the quality of 
TMR subsidiaries, particularly in sectors where the low productivity of affiliates’ production 
was supported through trade barriers-induced market distortions. MNEs have taken advantage 
of liberalisation to exploit production capacity in fewer locations to exploit economies of 
scale, especially where local consumption patterns are not radically different to justify local 
capacity and where transportation costs are not prohibitive. This has meant that some TMRs 
have been downgraded to sales and marketing affiliates. Except for sectors where policy-
induced distortions persist, FDI now largely reflects comparative advantages. Group I 
countries with abundant natural resources now receive much more resource-seeking FDI, and 
less upstream FDI in manufacturing (ECLAC 2001). 
Countries with superior ‘non-generic’ locational assets – in other words, Group II – 
tend to receive such higher value adding, knowledge intensive FDI. Countries without the 
capacity – both in terms of infrastructure and necessary skilled human capital - are unlikely to 
be hosts to RPS, RPMs or WPMs. Deepening of affiliate activity is increasingly associated 
with the location’s ability to be integrated with the rest of the MNE and its ability to provide 
unique knowledge-intensive inputs not available elsewhere. Data published by ECLAC   21 
(2001) suggests that FDI activity in Latin America– with the exception of Mexico and the 
Caribbean - continues to focus on serving local markets and traditional resource-seeking 
activities. 
In other words, domestic capacity – whether in the form of knowledge infrastructure 
or efficient domestic industrial sector - is a primary determinant of high competence foreign 
affiliates. Some countries have succeeded in attracting such FDI, notably Mexico, and the 
Caribbean Basin (ECLAC 2000, 2001, Mortimore 2000). In addition to providing domestic 
capabilities and a threshold level of infrastructure, these countries have invested in developing 
knowledge infrastructure (although to a lesser extent in the case of Mexico). More 
importantly, these countries have had long-term bilateral agreements with the US. Like 
incentives, bilateral ties are not on their own sufficient conditions to attract FDI, but studies 
have shown that the longer they persist, the greater their effect (Mudambi 1998 Blonigen and 
Davies 2000). 
An important avenue through which redistribution effects of FDI can be seen is 
through privatisation. Between 1988 and 1999, $107.3 billion worth of privatised firms had 
been acquired through cross-border M&A. The share of Latin America and the Caribbean was 
roughly 79.8% (UNCTAD 2000). In other words, during this period, about 20% of the total 
inflows to this region were associated with privatisation. Overall, liberalisation has been very 
beneficial to MNEs. Privatisation, in particular, has allowed foreign investors to acquire fully 
operational (albeit often inefficient) firms in countries at relatively low cost, due inter alia to 
depreciation of exchange rates of the recipient economies. From a national perspective, 
inflows from privatisation represent a single, one-off phenomenon - MNE acquisitions 
through privatisation schemes may initially generate a large initial infusion of capital, but 
subsequent inflows are by no means guaranteed. Indeed, in many cases state-owned 
companies that have been most attractive to FDI have often been the more efficient ones, 
requiring relatively little in the way of upgrading. It should be noted that a majority of 
privatisations are in the services sector. Furthermore, because MNEs intend to generate some 
rents from these investments, the net inflows can be expected to be significantly smaller in 
subsequent years.  As such, the net effect on the economy is possibly neutral, and FDI 
represents simply a redistribution of assets from domestic to foreign capitalists or from the 
state to foreign firms
i.  
 
4.4 Regional integration after liberalisation. 
   22 
Intra-Group I RI  
Take the case of two Group I countries undertaking shallow integration after 
liberalisation. Let us assume that this implies common external barriers, but relatively free (or 
at least lower) intra-regional trade barriers.  This gives MNEs (and domestic firms) an 
opportunity to exploit scale economies in market seeking investment. Thus, an MNE may 
consider a TMR where two single activity affiliates might previously have existed. But such 
an operation can either be in country A or in country B. Assuming similar factor endowments 
and de facto freedom of movement of goods and services, the decision is often based on 
incentives and subsidies. Such contests can only erode the net benefits of FDI. In general, RI 
will have no influence on the spatial distribution of resource-seeking investments, since these 
are already based on comparative advantage.  
Group I-Group II RI 
Here, a clearer variation in endowments and location advantages exist. An RI–driven 
reorganisation of MNE activity is certainly possible with the higher competence activities in 
the Group II country (‘A’) and lower factor-endowment type activities in the Group I country 
(‘B’). However, liberalisation in neighbouring countries means that – unless external barriers 
are very high – the MNE may yet prefer to locate higher competence in country C located 
outside the boundaries of the RI. However, the determining factor whether Country A 
becomes host to a RPM subsidiary is the efficiency of its existing operations relative to other 
countries, and only secondarily, its participation in a RI scheme.  
North-South RI 
Although redistribution of MNE activity follows along similar lines to Group I-Group II 
integration, there are two obvious advantages of participation in a North South scheme that 
are not evident in a Group I-II RI. First, the Group III country (‘A’) is home to a large group 
of MNEs who are more likely to invest in Country B. The technological gap is much larger, 
and the pool of potential spillovers greater. Furthermore, such intra-regional FDI is more 
likely to be efficiency-seeking. Second, Country A provides a much larger market. Thus in 
terms of linkages, and simply in terms of FDI, there is a greater order of magnitude in terms 
of benefits.  As an example, Mexico with NAFTA has enjoyed increased FDI flows, both 
from within NAFTA and from its agreement with the EU. This has two advantages that (say) 
Mercosur does not have. First, NAFTA provides it access to the US. Certainly, many EU 
firms would not have invested in Mexico if it provided ease of access to, say, Honduras, or 
Brazil. Second, the EU, the US and Canada are home countries of a majority of the largest 
MNEs. South-South RI schemes do not always have the managerial, technological or capital   23 
capacity within the region to lead to an increase of intra-regional FDI of the same order of 
magnitude. In addition, MNEs from the South are themselves interested in improving their 
global competitiveness since they too must survive in global markets. Ceteris paribus, 
improved or cheaper access to another developing country is not in itself sufficient incentive, 
unless that location enjoys some considerable advantage over other developing countries.  
I have taken the example of a two-country RI for illustrative purposes. It is self-
evident that a larger group of participants obviously acts as a more powerful magnet for 
investment, although coordinating policy across a larger group is fraught with complications. 
I have also had to assume that RI schemes have been implemented uniformly. Unfortunately, 
this is rarely the case. There are certain limitations that are associated with achieving even the 
most modest gains from RI. First, there is the lack of common institutions, and the lack of 
political consensus in creating these. Take for instance the various and overlapping Latin 
American RI schemes, some of whose members have been in the throes of regional 
integration on a sporadic basis for over two decades. A recent study by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (2000) highlights the various problems in regulatory and institutional 
frameworks between Latin American countries. For instance, a truck carrying goods from 
Brazil to Chile requires 200 hours for a 3500 Km journey, of which 50% is spent in the two 
border crossings. As I have highlighted before, the development of common institutions is a 
slow and gradual process. It is here that the benefit of a history of regional integration 
attempts and a similarity of cultures helps the most. Previous cooperative institution building 
allows countries to continue in that vein, but political differences and a lack of congruity in 
goals means that RI schemes remained largely incomplete.  
A second limitation of actual RI schemes compared to the stylised one is that there is 
rarely conformity to a common external barrier that is higher than the (common) internal 
barriers. A third related limitation is the reluctance to agree amongst members about structural 
adjustment. Each country wishes to maintain its national champions and ‘status’ projects, 
such that considerable duplication exists. Achieving consensus as to how to rationalise this is 
avoided by excluding such sensitive sectors from agreements. For instance, one industry in 
Latin America, which might benefit from intra-RI rationalisation of production is the 
automobile sector. However, in the case of the Mercosur countries which are hosts to a sizable 
presence of MNEs producing automobiles for each domestic market dating back to the 
import-substituting era, there is some reluctance to allow intra-regional free access 
(Mortimore 1998). This was also the case initially with European integration. Until the early 
1980s, much of FDI was defensive market seeking, and intra-European FDI was considerably   24 
low, as each country maintained its national champions. European firms are significant home 
countries for MNEs- indeed, many European countries are net outward investors but not to 
other European countries. European MNEs possess significant ownership-specific assets 
(whether technological, managerial or through privileged access to complementary assets) not 
available to developing country firms. This means that prior to RI there was already a large 
untapped potential for intra-European activity. Secondly, the presence of such large and 
competitive firms implies location-specific advantages in the form of institutions, 
infrastructure and other economic actors that can act as a ‘magnet’ to foreign (whether intra-
or extra-regional) MNEs, quite apart from the attractions of a large market.  However, intra-
EU FDI and rationalisation of production within the EU only took place after considerable 
efforts were made by the European Commission to ‘push’ EU firms to rationalise and create 
trans-European efficiency of their activities (Narula 1999). Member countries provided EU 
firms a grace period of protection within which to improve their competitiveness, after which 
market forces would decide which players survived, (in theory) regardless of national origin. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has tried to illustrate how the strategies of MNEs have responded to globalisation 
and attempted to evaluate MNEs’ response to regional integration separately in both a pre and 
post-liberalisation environment.  
From the MNEs' perspective, liberalisation has had a greater effect on their strategies 
than regional integration. Globalisation of MNE activity and liberalisation of countries has led 
to a downgrading of MNE activity in most LDCs and some more advanced developing 
countries. Much of the gains in FDI flows have been a result of redistribution, associated with 
the transfer of state and privately owned domestic firms to foreign ownership. Only a handful 
of countries have seen an improvement in the quality of FDI. These countries have a threshold 
level of domestic capability and infrastructure, as well as institutions that are more efficient. 
In general, RI schemes have reinforced these trends, benefiting those countries that have 
developed their domestic sector and worked towards creating the appropriate multilateral 
institutions to exploit cross-border efficiencies. Furthermore, these countries have been 
involved in North-South RI schemes.  
The objective of development strategies in both pre- and post-liberalisation phases has 
been to develop and sustain the competitiveness of domestic industry. Liberalisation has 
brought with it more MNE-friendly policies, with the objective of leveraging FDI for capacity 
building. However, the quality of FDI and the potential for spillovers varies considerably,   25 
depending on the motivation for FDI and the kind of subsidiary.  In general, there has been a 
downgrading of MNE activity in most Group I countries and some Group II countries. Much 
of the gains in FDI flows have been a result of redistribution, associated with the substitution 
of state and privately owned domestic firms to foreign ownership, and the gains therefrom are 
dubious from a developmental perspective. The only countries that have attracted ‘the right 
kind’ of FDI have been those that have the appropriate knowledge infrastructure, sound, 
stable economic policies and the potential for a competitive domestic sector. MNE 
subsidiaries do not develop in isolation from the domestic sector. In other words, participants 
of South-South agreements are unlikely to receive much FDI over and above that which they 
might have received in the first place in a post-liberalised world, based on their comparative 
advantage, and indeed, may suffer from negative redistribution effects. It is important to 
emphasise that the analysis here has focused solely on MNE strategies,: there can be (and are) 
considerable other benefits from participation in RI schemes through other mechanisms. 
For most developing countries, RI on the heels of liberalisation has not improved 
matters, except possibly for Group II countries in South-South RI schemes, and within North-
South RI schemes. In other words, the situation has improved for the ‘haves’ and not the 
‘have-nots’. Regional integration improves only one type of location advantage: RI are 
associated with increases in de facto market size, and thus, logically, the largest benefit from 
increased FDI are those that are motivated by efforts to acquire access to these markets. This 
is no different from the advantages that liberalisation is purported to offer. From the MNEs 
perspective, liberalisation is a bigger ‘pull’ than a smaller, closed club of regional integration 
unless that club offers some unique advantage not available elsewhere. Besides increases in 
market size are rarely achieved in most South-South RI schemes, because the multilateral 
institutions necessary to promote de facto cross-border efficiencies are simply not present. RI 
schemes have a completely different outcome post- and pre-liberalisation vis-à-vis MNE 
strategies, and RI simply reinforces changes in MNE strategies in response to liberalisation, 
rather than counteracting them. Our reading of the secondary evidence on RI is broadly in line 
with the findings of Blomstrom and Kokko (1997), who concluded that the greater the 
liberalisation associated with RI, and the stronger the location advantages, the more likely it is 
that RI will lead to increased FDI inflows. 
The sudden change from import-substituting to multilateral liberalisation has taken 
most countries by surprise (Mortimore 2000). They need to respond to globalisation, but this 
requires time and new institutions that are responsive to multilateral issues and an 
interdependent world. However, institution building is a slow and gradual process. This is   26 
where RI provides long-term benefits, because it potentially allows countries to gradually 
respond to globalisation in a controlled – and stepwise- manner. Adjusting institutions and 
improving intra-regional efficiencies with a small group of similar countries should logically 
be easier to respond to immediately than to the entire membership of the WTO. RI should be 
regarded as a stepping-stone to globalisation. To elucidate, RI offers developing countries a 
window of opportunity to dampen the shock of entry into a fully multilateral and globalising 
world, by ‘practising’ on a smaller version. Mexico is illustrative of the slow and gradual 
process of structural adjustment. Mexico has undertaken increasing RI within NAFTA while 
also deepening its integration with other partners such as the EU. This is acknowledged as 
part of a broader integration into the world economy (ECLAC 2000). The danger of course, is 
that RI schemes can act as an excuse to return to a pre-liberalisation world of excessive 
protection.  
  Additionally, development policies need to integrate a more sophisticated view of 
FDI.  As Mortimore (2000) illustrates well, although Latin American countries have 
succeeded in attracting a large quantity of FDI, it has thus far ignored the issue of quality of 
FDI. Additionally, Mortimore points out that there is a failure to fully integrate and coordinate 
domestic capacity improvement goals with FDI policies. 
RI can be seen to be a useful policy tool in promoting competitiveness if exploited 
carefully, and within an integrated development policy agenda. Although RI per se may not 
have any great benefit for Group I countries in terms of quality of FDI, or in terms of direct 
spillovers to their domestic sectors, there are other reasons to participate. First, RI does 
increase FDI flow (albeit of limited quality) and help the least developed countries escape the 
vicious cycle of poverty. Increased resource-seeking investment and market seeking 
investment is better than no investment at all. Second, it does allow them to prepare for 
greater liberalisation, allowing for a gradual widening and deepening of cross-border 
interdependence. The reasons that countries do not enjoy greater welfare benefits from RI are 
the same as those that limit the benefits from liberalisation in general: Firstly, the lack of a 
threshold level of domestic capabilities (Borzenstein et al 1998), secondly, the lack of long 
term political stability (Freeman and Lindauer 1999) and thirdly, the absence of efficient 
institutions, both domestic and multilateral. Participation in an RI scheme creates an 
imperative to improve at least some of these and in many cases acts as a catalyst to escape 
structural inertia and lock-in (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Fourthly, like liberalisation, the 
costs of non-participation in a genuinely integrated RI scheme are high, particularly when 
most other countries are doing so.    27   28 
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i Much of the state-owned assets acquired by MNEs are in services and infrastructure.  It needs to be 
acknowledged that such investments have an important welfare effect.  
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